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I. INTRODUCTION
When Congress created the Federal Circuit, its central purpose was to
promote uniformity and certainty of legal doctrines in patent law.1 However,
since its creation in 1982, the Federal Circuit has been the subject of many
criticisms.2 Recently, the Supreme Court has joined in this criticism. In the
Federal Circuit’s first fifteen years, the Supreme Court stayed largely out of
its way and only heard eight cases involving patent issues.3 However,
according to a 2013 study, the Supreme Court has since heard twenty-eight
patent cases, and in 80 percent of them has “reversed, vacated, modified, or
otherwise seriously questioned the Federal Circuit’s approach.”4 This recent
Supreme Court involvement in patent law leaves critics to believe the
Federal Circuit needs some sort of reform.5 Specifically, critics, including
the Supreme Court, believe that the Federal Circuit adopts specific patent
rules that deviate from traditional general legal principles.6 Additionally,
critics believe the Federal Circuit has a pro-patent bias, which would favor
patent holders’ policy considerations over those of non-patent holders.7
Lastly, critics also believe the Federal Circuit fails to adequately address
policy considerations.8
After the increased Supreme Court involvement in patent law in recent
years, has the Federal Circuit learned from the Supreme Court’s guidance
and become more consistent with traditional legal principles and Congress’
intended policy objectives? This article will explore this issue in light of the
Federal Circuit’s recent holding in Sandoz v. Amgen on remand.
The Supreme Court recently issued its landmark decision in Sandoz v.
Amgen, primarily interpreting the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(2)(A) of
the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (“BPCIA”).9 Section
262(l)(2)(A) provides that when an applicant submits an application to the
FDA for approval of a biosimilar product, the applicant must provide certain
1. NEW YORK CITY BAR ASSOCIATION, SHOULD PATENT JURISDICTION BE REMOVED FROM THE
JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND RETURNED TO REGIONAL COURTS OF APPEAL? REPORTS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON PATENTS AND COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL COURTS 2 (2015) [hereinafter “NY Bar
Report”].
2. Id. at 3.
3. Id. at 4 (citing Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Percolation, Uniformity, and Coherent Adjudication: The
Federal Circuit Experience, 66 SMU L. REV. 505, 509–10 (2013)).
4. Id. (citing Dreyfuss, supra note 4, at 509–10).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 8.
7. Id. at 7–8.
8. Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit Comes of Age, 23
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 809 (2008).
9. Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664 (2017). See Biologics Price Competition and
Innovation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(2)(A) (2010) [hereinafter “BPCIA”].
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initial disclosures to the sponsor of the reference product.10 The Supreme
Court held that noncompliance under § 262(l)(2)(A) was not enforceable by
injunction under federal law and ordered the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) to determine on remand whether noncompliance
under § 262(l)(2)(A) of the BPCIA was enforceable by injunction under state
law.11 On December 14, 2017, the Federal Circuit issued its decision on
remand and held that noncompliance under § 262(l)(2)(A) of the BPCIA was
also not enforceable by injunction under state law.12 However, did the
Federal Circuit get it right?
This article begins by providing a background describing the BPCIA
generally, the Supreme Court’s decision in Sandoz v. Amgen, and the Federal
Circuit’s decision on remand. The article then evaluates the Federal Circuit’s
decision on remand and discusses whether the Federal Circuit correctly
found BPCIA preemption. Specifically, this article will discuss whether the
Federal Circuit’s finding of BPCIA preemption remained consistent with
traditional legal principles of preemption and with Congress’ underlying
policy concerns behind the BPCIA.
After this analysis, this article will conclude that the Federal Circuit did
stay consistent with traditional legal principles of preemption. To support
these conclusions, this article will discuss how the Federal Circuit correctly
applied the law from traditional field and conflict preemption cases to find
that the field of patent law is generally a federal matter and that state law
remedies would conflict with the federal objectives in the BPCIA. Finally,
this article will conclude that the Federal Circuit also stayed consistent with
Congress’ underlying policy concerns in the BPCIA. In reaching this
conclusion, the article will discuss how the Federal Circuit considered
Congress’ underlying policy concerns in the BPCIA, to balance the interests
of pioneer biologics companies and biosimilar applicants, and ruled in a way
so as to maintain this balance. Thus, it appears that, at least in Sandoz v.
Amgen, the Federal Circuit is “learning its lessons” and considering
traditional legal principles and policy concerns.
II. BACKGROUND
Brief Introduction of the BPCIA
In the 1980s, Congress was challenged with addressing the opposing
concerns raised by the pharmaceutical industry and the general public that
10. Sandoz Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 1670–71.
11. Id. at 1675–76.
12. Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 877 F.3d 1315, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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needed cheaper drugs. As further explained later in this article, Congress
needed to find a way to “encourage innovation in pharmaceutical research”
while also helping provide the general public with access to “lower-cost” or
“generic” drugs.13 In 1984, Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act (commonly known as the “Hatch-Waxman
Act”) to address these conflicting concerns.14 Even though the HatchWaxman Act only applied to non-biologic15 drugs, it provided Congress with
a model to adopt for biologic drugs.16 In the 1990s, Congress began their
efforts to harmonize the non-biologic and biologic drug laws.17 After years
of work, in 2010, Congress passed the BPCIA to establish a “biosimilars
pathway balancing innovation and consumer interests.”18 Like the HatchWaxman Act before it, the BPCIA was a compromise between the competing
interests of the pioneer biologics companies and the general public. To
encourage innovation, the BPCIA gave pioneer biologic companies a 12year period of exclusivity on their drugs in order to recoup costs and make a
profit.19 To lower consumer drug prices, the BPCIA created an abbreviated
pathway for FDA approval of biosimilars.20 Thus, in passing the BPCIA,
Congress reached yet another compromise, this time between the competing
interests of the pioneer biologics companies and the general public.
As previously stated, the BPCIA provides an abbreviated pathway for
obtaining FDA approval of a biosimilar drug. A biosimilar drug is a
“biologic product that is highly similar to a biologic product that has already
been approved by the [FDA].”21 The already approved biologic product is
referred to as the “reference product.”22 The pioneer biologic company that
created the reference product is referred to as the “sponsor” company.23

13. Allen M. Sokal & Bart A. Gerstenblith, The Hatch-Waxman Act: Encouraging Innovation and
Generic Drug Competition, FINNEGAN (2010), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/the-hatchwaxman-act-encouraging-innovation-and-generic-drug.html.
14. Id.
15. A non-biologic drug is a traditional drug that is “typically synthesized from chemicals,” whereas
a biologic drug is a type of drug “derived from natural, biological sources such as animals or
microorganisms.” Sandoz Inc.,137 S. Ct. at 1669–70.
16. Krista Hessler Carver, et al., An Unofficial Legislative History of the Biologics Price
Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 671, 672 (2010).
17. Id. at 687.
18. BPCIA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 7001(b), 124 Stat. 119, 804 (2010).
19. Richard Epstein, The Constitutional Protection of Trade Secrets and Patents under the Biologics
Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, N.Y.U. LAW AND ECONOMICS WORKING PAPERS 285,
286 (2011).
20. Id.
21. Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1669 (2017).
22. Id. at 1666.
23. Id.
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To obtain FDA approval of a biosimilar drug, the applicant must follow
the pathway provided in § 262(k) of the BPCIA.24 Additionally, the applicant
must follow § 262(l)(2)(A) and § 262(l)(8)(A) of the BPCIA, which are at
issue in this case and explained further below.25 If the applicant fails to
follow these requirements, then the sponsor may immediately bring an action
for declaratory judgment of infringement, validity, or enforceability of a
patent.26
Sandoz & Amgen Dispute Background
Turning to the Sandoz v. Amgen case, Neupogen, a filgrastim product
used to stimulate the production of white blood cells, is the reference product
marketed by Amgen.27 Amgen is the pioneer sponsor and patent holder for
patents on methods of manufacturing and using filgrastim. 28 Sandoz is a
competitor that sought FDA approval to market a biosimilar filgrastim
product named Zarxio.29 The FDA notified Sandoz that its application had
been accepted for review, and the following day Sandoz notified Amgen of
the submitted application and its intent to market Zarxio immediately after
receiving FDA approval.30 Later, Sandoz notified Amgen that it did not
intend to provide the application materials and manufacturing information
required by § 262(l)(2)(A) of the BPCIA.31 Amgen sued Sandoz for patent
infringement and “unlawful” conduct in violation of California’s unfair
competition law based on the following two BPCIA violations: (1) for not
providing the application materials and manufacturing information as
required by § 262(l)(2)(A), and (2) for violating the notice of commercial
marketing requirement under
§ 262(l)(8)(A).32 Amgen sought
injunctions to enforce both BPCIA requirements.33 While the case was
pending, the FDA licensed Zarxio and Sandoz provided Amgen further
notice of commercial marketing.34
The District Court granted partial judgment on the pleadings to Sandoz
on the BPCIA counterclaims and dismissed Amgen’s state-law unfair

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1672–73.
Id. at 1673.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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competition claims.35 The Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Amgen’s
state-law claim based on § 262(l)(2)(A), holding that “Sandoz did not violate
the BPCIA in failing to disclose its application and manufacturing
information” and that the BPCIA provides the exclusive remedies for failure
to comply with this requirement.36 The court also held that under §
262(l)(8)(A), an applicant must provide notice of commercial marketing
after obtaining licensure, and that this requirement is mandatory.37 The court
then enjoined Sandoz from marketing Zarxio until 180 days after it provided
its second notice.38 Both parties petitioned for a rehearing en banc, which the
Federal Circuit denied.39 Sandoz then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari
in the Supreme Court regarding the
§ 262(l)(8)(A) requirement.40
Amgen then filed a conditional cross-petition for writ of certiorari regarding
the § 262(l)(2)(A) requirement and whether the sole remedy was that
provided under § 262(l)(9)(C).41 The Supreme Court subsequently granted
both petitions and consolidated the cases in Sandoz v. Amgen.42
The Supreme Court’s Decision in Sandoz v. Amgen
The first portion of the BPCIA at issue in this case is § 262(l)(2)(A),
which provides that, when an applicant submits an application to the FDA
for approval of a biosimilar product, the applicant must provide its
application materials and manufacturing information to the sponsor of the
reference product within 20 days of notification from the FDA that the
application has been accepted for review.43 The Supreme Court addressed
whether the requirement under § 262(l)(2)(A) is enforceable by injunction
under federal law. In answering this question, the Supreme Court focused
solely on the text of § 262. Specifically, the Court looked to the provisions
in § 262 that provided remedies.44 First, the Court looked to § 262(l)(9)(C),
which provided a remedy for when an applicant failed to comply with the §
262(l)(2)(A) application and manufacturing information disclosure
requirements.45 Section 262(l)(9)(C) authorizes the sponsor to bring an
immediate declaratory judgment action for infringement when an applicant
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 877 F.3d 1315, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1319–20.
Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1669 (2017). See BPCIA, 42 U.S.C.§ 262(l)(2)(A).
Sandoz Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 1675.
Id.
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fails to comply with § 262(l)(2)(A).46 The Court concluded that by explicitly
providing the remedy in § 262(l)(9)(C), Congress implicitly excluded all
other federal remedies, including injunctive relief.47 In holding this, the
Court found, “when Congress wished to provide a private damage remedy,
it knew how to do so and did so expressly.”48 Thus, the Court inferred from
the text that Congress only intended to provide the declaratory judgment
remedy in § 262(l)(9)(C) for failure to comply with § 262(l)(2)(A), and if
Congress wanted to provide injunctive relief, then it would have done so
expressly. In holding this, the Court found
§ 262(l)(2)(A) was not
enforceable by injunction under federal law.
The Supreme Court also addressed whether the requirement under §
262(l)(2)(A) is enforceable by injunction under state law. In answering this
question, the Court looked to the parties’ briefs, which “frame this issue as
whether the § 262(l)(2)(A) requirement is mandatory in all circumstances . .
. or merely a condition precedent to the information exchange process.”49
The Court reasoned that if this requirement was only a “condition
precedent,” then the applicant can withhold this information without
committing an “unlawful” act.50 The Court then concluded that this issue did
not present a question of federal law because there was no dispute over how
the federal scheme worked.51 Rather, the Court concluded that whether this
requirement was mandatory or conditional “only mattered for the purposes
of California’s unfair competition law, which penalizes ‘unlawful’
conduct.”52 Thus, the Court held this was a state-law question and that the
Federal Circuit, on remand, should decide if this conduct was “unlawful”
under California law.53 Lastly, the Court held the Federal Circuit should also
decide whether the BPCIA preempts any additional state law remedies for
failure to comply with § 262(l)(2)(A).54 The Federal Circuit’s holdings on
remand will be discussed in the following section of this article.
The second portion of the BPCIA at issue in this case was
§
262(l)(8)(A), which provides that the applicant must provide a 180-day
notice to the sponsor of the reference product before the date of the first
commercial marketing of the biosimilar product.55 The Supreme Court
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 572 (1979)).
Id. at 1676.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1666. See BPCIA, 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(8)(A).
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addressed whether the applicant must give notice to the sponsor after, rather
than before, obtaining a license from the FDA for its biosimilar. The Court
found that the applicant may provide notice to the sponsor either before or
after receiving FDA approval.56 This means the applicant can give notice
before FDA approval, starting the 180-day clock, and begin commercial
marketing immediately after FDA approval so long as the 180 days has run.
Essentially, this means the sponsor’s commercial marketing exclusivity
period could be cut 180-days shorter than it would have been if notice was
required after FDA approval.
However, as previously stated, the Supreme Court’s decision in Sandoz
v. Amgen did not answer all the issues raised. One question, whether the
requirement under § 262(l)(2)(A) that an applicant provide its application
and manufacturing information to the sponsor of the reference product is
enforceable by injunction under state law, was not answered by the Court
and was sent back to the Federal Circuit to answer on remand. This question
necessarily raised an issue for the Federal Circuit to answer on remand:
whether the BPCIA preempts any additional state law remedies for failure to
comply with § 262(l)(2)(A). This issue is the main focus of the remaining
sections of this article.
The Federal Circuit’s Decision on Remand
The main issue the Federal Circuit addressed on remand was whether
the BPCIA preempts state law remedies for failure to comply with
§
262(l)(2)(A). Before deciding this issue, the Federal Circuit addressed
whether Sandoz waived its preemption defense. The court decided to
exercise its discretion and to address preemption, even though Sandoz did
not argue the preemption defense before the District Court, reasoning that
preemption in this case was “a significant question [] of general impact or of
great public concern.”57 Lastly, in deciding this preemption issue, the Federal
Circuit applied its own law.58
In addressing preemption, the Federal Circuit first looked to the
Supremacy Clause, which states that federal law “shall be the supreme Law
of the Land.”59 Under the Supremacy Clause, state law can be preempted
through express preemption, field preemption, or conflict preemption.60

56. Sandoz Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 1677.
57. Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 877 F.3d 1315, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Hall v. Bed Bath &
Beyond, Inc., 705 F.3d 1357, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2013)).
58. Id. at 1325–26.
59. Id. at 1326 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2).
60. Id.
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Express preemption is “a question of congressional intent and when
Congress has made its intent known through explicit statutory language.”61
However, express preemption was not the issue in this appeal since the
BPCIA does not explicitly state Congress’ intent to preempt state law.62 Field
preemption occurs when state law is preempted because “it regulates conduct
in a field that Congress intended the Federal Government to occupy
exclusively.”63 This congressional intent for field preemption can be inferred
from a “scheme of federal regulation . . . so pervasive as to make reasonable
the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it,” or
where an Act of Congress “touch[es] a field in which the federal interest is
so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement
of state laws on the same subject.”64 If field preemption applies because
Congress intended federal law to occupy an entire field, then “even
complementary state regulation is impermissible.”65 Conflict preemption
occurs when state laws conflict with federal law.66 This happens when “it is
impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal
requirements, or where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”67 The Federal
Circuit then concluded that both field and conflict preemption were present
in this case.68
In finding that field preemption was present, the Federal Circuit noted
that patent litigation is not a field in which the States have traditionally
occupied.69 In finding this, the court reasoned that “patents are ‘inherently
federal in character’ because a patent ‘originates from, is governed by, and
terminates according to federal law.’”70 Further, the court noted that
Congress granted federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over cases relating to
patents.71 The court also noted that the FDA has “exclusive authority to
license biosimilars.”72 Comparing this case to the field preemption found in
Arizona v. United States, the court found that “the scheme here is

61. Id. (quoting English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78–79 (1990)).
62. Id.
63. Id. (quoting English, 496 U.S. at 79).
64. Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
65. Id. (quoting Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 401 (2012)).
66. Id.
67. Id. (quoting English, 496 U.S. at 79).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1327.
70. Id. (citing Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 347 (2001) (quoting Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947))).
71. Id. (citing Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 253 (2013) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2011))).
72. Id.
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‘comprehensive’ and ‘provide[s] a full set of standards governing’ the
exchange of information in biosimilar patent litigation, ‘including the
punishment for noncompliance.’”73 Further, the court found that “BPCIA’s
comprehensive, carefully calibrated ‘scheme of federal regulation . . . [is] so
pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for
the States to supplement it.’”74 Thus, in so finding this, the court found field
preemption applied.
The Federal Circuit also found that conflict preemption was present.
The court noted that Amgen sought state law injunctive relief, even though
injunctive relief was not present in federal law through the BPCIA, and cited
the Supreme Court’s holding that “[b]ecause § 262(l)(9)(C) provides the
exclusive federal remedy for failure to comply with § 262(l)(2)(A), federal
law does not permit injunctive relief or damages for such failure.”75 The
court then cited Arizona again in finding that “[p]ermitting the State to
impose its own penalties for the [alleged violation of federal law] here would
conflict with the careful framework Congress adopted.”76 Thus, the court
held that there was also conflict preemption because there was no federal
injunctive relief under the BPCIA. To allow state law to provide injunctive
relief would “clash” with Congress’ intent behind the BPCIA.77
III. EVALUATING THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S FINDING OF BPCIA
PREEMPTION
Consistency with Traditional Preemption Principles
Looking to the Federal Circuit’s decision, I will now discuss whether
the Federal Circuit correctly decided this issue in terms of traditional
preemption principles. Specifically, I will discuss whether the Federal
Circuit appears to remain consistent with the general legal principles
regarding preemption, or rather, is making the type of specialized rules for
patent law for which it is often criticized. Since the Federal Circuit decided
the case on field and conflict preemption grounds, I will focus on those two
grounds.
As described above, Article VI of the Constitution contains the
Supremacy Clause, which provides that the “[l]aws of the United States . . .”

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. (quoting Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 401 (2012)).
Id. at 1328 (citing Rice, 331 U.S. at 230).
Id. (citing Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1675 (2017)).
Id. at 1328 (citing Arizona, 567 U.S. at 402).
Id. at 1329.
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(i.e. federal law) “shall be the Supreme Law of the Land.”78 As a result of
this federal supremacy, “States have no power . . . to retard, impede, burden,
or in any manner control the operations of the Constitutional laws enacted
by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the [Federal]
Government.”79 Further, “[A]cts of the State Legislatures . . . [that] interfere
with, or are contrary to the laws of the Congress [are to be invalidated
because] [i]n every such case, the act of Congress . . . is supreme; and the
law of the State, though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted,
must yield to it.”80 So, when there is a conflict between federal and state law,
the federal law controls and invalidates the state law because federal law is
supreme.
The difficulty, however, is in deciding whether a particular state or local
law conflicts with federal law and requires preemption. The Supreme Court
gave some guidance to this inquiry in Gade v. National Solid Wastes
Management Association:
Preemption may be either express or implied and is compelled
whether Congress’ command is explicitly stated in the statute’s
language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose. Absent
explicit preemptive language, we have recognized at least two types
of implied preemption: field preemption, where the scheme of federal
regulation is so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that
Congress left no room for the States to supplement it, and conflict
preemption, where compliance with both federal and state
regulations is a physical impossibility, or where state law stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress.81

Unfortunately, Congress is rarely clear about its intent for preemption
to apply or the scope of what is preempted.82 As a result, courts must interpret
Congress’ intent and decide what is preempted as “‘[t]he purpose of
Congress is the ‘ultimate touchstone’ in every preemptive case.”83 However,
“although the Court purports to be finding congressional intent, it often is
left to make guesses about purpose based on fragments of statutory language,

78. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
79. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 436 (1819).
80. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 211 (1824).
81. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (internal citations omitted).
82. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 453 (Wolters Kluwer, 5th ed. 2017).
83. Id. (citing Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (quoting Retain Clerks v.
Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 96, 103 (1963))).
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random statements in the legislative history, and the degree of detail of the
federal regulation.”84
Applying the Court’s guidance in Gade to this case, the Federal Circuit
was correct in concluding only field and conflict preemption apply here.85
First, looking at the BPCIA, there is no express preemption language; thus,
implied preemption is the only possibility.
Looking first at field preemption, the Federal Circuit appeared to follow
the correct general legal principles. Field preemption is a type of implied
preemption where the federal regulation is “so pervasive as to make
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to
supplement it.”86 In other words, “the federal interest is so dominant that the
federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the
same subject.”87 Field preemption has been found in a number of situations.
For example, in Hines v. Davidowitz and Arizona v. United States, the
Supreme Court found field preemption in the immigration law context.88 In
Hines, the Court found the alien registration system was enacted by Congress
to create one uniform national registration system, and state law could not
be enforced when it interfered with this federal regulation.89 The Court
emphasized that alien registration “is in a field which affects international
relations,” so it “demand[ed] broad national authority.”90 The Court also
emphasized the “extensive federal regulation in immigration, including a
‘broad and comprehensive plan describing the terms and conditions upon
which aliens may enter this country’” and the fact that aliens were required
to register with the federal government.91
Like immigration, patents are usually a matter of federal law, not state
law.92 The United States pointed out in its Amicus brief that “[w]hile
Congress has not occupied the field of patent law or intellectual property law
more generally . . . Congress has occupied the field of federal patent
litigation.”93 Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over patent law

84. Id.
85. Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 877 F.3d 1315, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
86. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
87. Id.
88. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 5272–74 (1941); Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 402–
03 (2012).
89. Hines, 312 U.S. at 73–74.
90. Id. at 68.
91. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 82, at 467 (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 69).
92. Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Law Federalism, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 11, 12 (2014).
93. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 3, Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 877 F.3d 1315
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (No. 2015-1499) [hereinafter “US Amicus Brief”].
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claims, and state courts are expressly barred from hearing these claims.94
Additionally, federal laws and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern
the “presentation of patent claims and defenses.”95 For these reasons, it
appears the “federal interest is so dominant” in federal patent litigation so as
to “preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject,” and the scheme
of federal patent litigation regulation is “so pervasive as to make reasonable
the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.”96
Congress’ occupation of federal patent litigation is the an important
consideration supporting a finding that patent law is usually within the field
of federal law.
Also, like obtaining citizenship and alien registration in immigration
law, patents can only be obtained and registered by the federal government.
Further, Congress created many patent laws that provide a “broad and
comprehensive plan describing the terms and conditions” upon which one
may obtain a patent.97 Congress’ rules and regulations for obtaining patents
is another factor supporting a finding that patent law is usually within the
field of federal law.
So, it appears that, in general, patent law is usually within the field of
federal law. However, this case is about biosimilars and the BPCIA
specifically. Like the regulation in Hines, the BPCIA appears to be an
“extensive federal regulation” with a “broad and comprehensive plan” for
obtaining FDA approval of biosimilars.98 The Supreme Court expressly
recognized this and also found that the BPCIA created a “carefully calibrated
scheme” for adjudicating patent infringement claims between sponsors and
applicants.99 These reasons support an inference that the “federal interest is
so dominant” in biosimilar litigation so as to “preclude enforcement of state
laws on the same subject,” and the scheme of biosimilar litigation regulation
is “so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no
room for the States to supplement it.”100 Thus, it appears that the BPCIA,
like patent law generally, is likely within the field of federal law.
Comparing this analysis to the Federal Circuit’s analysis in this case (as
described in the previous section of this article), the analysis looks almost
identical. The Federal Circuit first looked to the field preemption principles
as described in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. The Federal Circuit then
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. See also Gugliuzza, supra note 92, at 12.
US Amicus Brief, supra note 93, at 3.
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 69 (1941).
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recognized that patent litigation is solely governed by federal law, that
patents are solely obtained by the federal government, and that biosimilars
are governed by the federal government through the FDA. The Federal
Circuit then looked to the BPCIA and found it was “comprehensive” like the
schemes in Arizona and Hines. Thus, the Federal Circuit appears to have
stuck strictly to the general legal principles regarding field preemption and
has “got it right” in terms of field preemption.
Next, turning to conflict preemption, the Federal Circuit again appears
to have followed the correct general legal principles. Conflict preemption is
a type of implied preemption where “there is a conflict between federal and
state law . . . even if federal law does not expressly preempt state law,
preemption will be found where ‘compliance with both federal and state
regulations is a physical impossibility.’”101 In other words, conflict
preemption is found where state law “stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.”102 Conflict preemption has been found in a number of situations.
For instance, in International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, the Supreme
Court found conflict preemption in the environmental law context.103 In
International Paper Co., the plaintiffs filed suit against the defendants for
alleged pollution under Vermont’s common law of nuisance.104 The
defendants argued, and the Supreme Court agreed, that the Clean Water Act
(“CWA”) preempted the common law nuisance suit.105 In finding conflict
preemption, the Supreme Court stated:
In determining whether Vermont nuisance law “stands as an
obstacle” to the full implementation of the CWA, it is not enough to
say that the ultimate goal of both federal and state law is to eliminate
water pollution. A state law is also preempted if it interferes with the
methods by which the federal statute was designed to reach this
goal.106

The Supreme Court then found conflict preemption because the
Vermont law would allow the plaintiffs to circumvent a system under the

101. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 82, at 453 (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,
373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963)).
102. Hines, 312 U.S. at 67.
103. Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 500 (1987).
104. Id. at 484.
105. Id. at 500.
106. Id. at 494.
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CWA, thus, “upsetting the balance of public and private interests so carefully
addressed” by the CWA.107
Like International Paper Co., allowing state law to apply concurrently
with federal law in the biosimilar context would upset the “balance of public
and private interests so carefully addressed” by Congress in the BPCIA. 108
Before the case went to the Supreme Court,109 the Federal Court found that
the initial disclosures under § 262(l)(2)(A) of the BPCIA were optional.110
In other words, Congress provided in the BPCIA a choice for applicants.111
If applicants choose to not make initial disclosures under
§ 262(l)(2)(A)
of the BPCIA, then that does not violate the BPCIA and is, rather, “a path
expressly contemplated by the BPCIA.”112 However, if state law mandates
these initial disclosures under § 262(l)(2)(A) of the BPCIA, then this would
be “an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.”113 Specifically, this state law would be depriving
applicants of the option to make initial disclosures under § 262(l)(2)(A) of
the BPCIA, which would be obstructing “a path expressly contemplated by
[Congress in enacting] the BPCIA.”114 Thus, “state law would obstruct [one
of] the BPCIA’s purposes and objectives.”115 Further, if state law applied
and was able to mandate these disclosures, that adds a burden to applicants,
which would upset the “balance of public and private interests so carefully
addressed” by Congress in the BPCIA.116 For these reasons, federal
preemption should apply since state law conflicts with federal law in regard
to the initial disclosures under § 262(l)(2)(A) of the BPCIA.
Similarly, Congress “imposed short and fixed statutory time limits on
each of the prescribed steps in 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(2) through (l)(6), leading
to the commencement of patent litigation no more than roughly 250 days
after FDA accepts the applicant’s biosimilar application for review.”117 If

107. Id.
108. Id.
109. It should be noted that the Supreme Court criticized the Federal Circuit’s analysis of whether
the initial disclosures were optional or mandatory. This is only included to explain another argument for
why conflict preemption should apply. Following this criticism, on remand, the Federal Circuit did not
rely on these grounds in its decision that conflict preemption applied. Rather, the Federal Circuit found
conflict preemption on other grounds, see Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1676 (2017).
110. US Amicus Brief, supra note 93, at 7.
111. Id.
112. US Amicus Brief, supra note 93, at 7 (citing Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347, 1357
(Fed. Cir. 2015)).
113. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
114. Amgen Inc., 794 F.3d at 1357.
115. US Amicus Brief, supra note 93, at 8. See also Hines, 312 U.S. at 67.
116. Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494 (1987).
117. US Amicus Brief, supra note 93, at 9.
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sponsors were able to also sue under state law, which would likely be long
and drawn-out litigation, this would undermine Congress’ goal in the BPCIA
to “expedit[e] the resolution of biosimilar patent disputes.”118 Thus, state law
would obstruct one of the BPCIA’s purposes and objectives.119 Again, this
would add another burden on the applicants, which would upset the “balance
of public and private interests so carefully addressed” by Congress in the
BPCIA.120 For these reasons, federal preemption should apply since state law
conflicts with federal law in regard to the “short and fixed statutory time
limits” of the BPCIA, which were designed to quickly resolve biosimilar
patent disputes.121
Likewise, the Supreme Court in Sandoz v. Amgen found that Congress
intended the remedies under the BPCIA to be the sole remedies for
noncompliance with the initial disclosures under § 262(l)(2)(A).122 If
injunction were allowed in state court, that would constitute an additional
remedy not provided by Congress in the BPCIA.123 If sponsors were able to
sue in state court for injunction, this would undermine Congress’ goal in the
BPCIA to provide the exclusive remedies for noncompliance. Thus, state law
would obstruct one of the BPCIA’s purposes and objectives.124 Again, this
would add another burden on the applicants, upsetting the balance of
interests considered by Congress in the BPCIA.125 For these reasons, federal
preemption should apply since state law conflicts with federal law in regard
to the BPCIA’s exclusive remedies for noncompliance.126
Comparing this analysis to the Federal Circuit’s analysis in this case,
the Federal Circuit focuses only on the issue of injunction conflicts.
However, even though the Federal Circuit did not discuss the initial
disclosures conflicts under the BPCIA or the litigation time limits conflicts
under the BPCIA, the Federal Circuit’s discussion of injunction conflicts
appears to be correct. Specifically, like the analysis described above, the
Federal Circuit found the BPCIA exclusively provided remedies for
noncompliance, so allowing state law injunction would “interfere with the
careful balance struck by Congress.”127 Thus, the Federal Circuit appears to
118. Id.
119. See Hines, 312 U.S. at 67.
120. Int’l Paper Co., 479 U.S. at 494.
121. US Amicus Brief, supra note 93, at 9.
122. Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1675 (2017).
123. US Amicus Brief, supra note 93, at 9–10.
124. See Hines, 312 U.S. at 67.
125. Int’l Paper Co., 479 U.S. at 494.
126. US Amicus Brief, supra note 93, at 9–10.
127. Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 877 F.3d 1315, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Arizona v. United
States, 567 U.S. 387, 405–06 (2012)).
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have stuck to the general legal principles regarding conflict preemption and
has “got it right” in terms of conflict preemption.
Therefore, the Federal Circuit appears to remain consistent with the
general legal principles regarding preemption, rather than making
specialized rules for patent law. Perhaps this means that the Federal Circuit,
at least in Sandoz v. Amgen, has “learned its lesson” that the Supreme Court
has been teaching for the past decade and is staying more consistent with
general legal principles.
Consistency with the BPCIA’s Underlying Policy Concerns
Looking to the Federal Circuit’s decision, I will now discuss whether
the Federal Circuit correctly decided this issue in terms of policy concerns.
Specifically, I will discuss whether the Federal Circuit appears to remain
consistent with Congress’ policy goals behind the BPCIA. To analyze this, I
will first provide a background to the policy Congress considered in enacting
the BPCIA.
An underlying concern behind the Hatch-Waxman Act and the BPCIA
was the pioneer companies’ fear that they do not have enough time for
exclusivity on the market because of how long it took to get FDA approval
before a drug could go on the market.128 To ensure ample protection, pioneer
companies filed patent applications while the drugs were still in
development.129 This meant the duration of patent protection began to run
before the drugs had even completed development and reached the market.130
Thus, by the time the drugs reached the market, pioneer companies had
already lost significant time to sell their products exclusively. In other words,
these companies had lost significant time to recoup their development costs
and make a profit before their patent protection expired and generics could
enter the market. Logically, if pioneer companies could not recoup their costs
and make a profit, the incentive to create new drugs would be diminished.
This desire to continue to encourage innovative research and development
was one of the competing concerns Congress faced in passing the HatchWaxman Act and the BPCIA.131
However, there also existed the opposing concern to help generic drugs
reach the market more quickly, which would provide the public with lowercost drugs.132 Before a generic drug could enter the market, the law required
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
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proof that the new drug was safe, effective, and accepted by the FDA.133
Additionally, clinical trials were required to get FDA approval, which took
considerable time and money.134 Yet, in Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar
Pharmaceutical Co., the Federal Circuit held that tests for FDA approval of
a generic drug infringed the patent on the branded drug. 135 Since the patent
had to expire before testing, and testing a drug and getting FDA approval
could take years, there was an extended amount of time of exclusivity of the
brand drug on the market.136 As a result, this brand drug enjoyed extended
exclusivity on the market allowing the pioneer company to keep the prices
high, meaning the public was not able to benefit from lower-cost generic
drugs for years. This public need for lower-cost generic drugs was the other
competing concern Congress faced in passing the Hatch-Waxman Act and
the BPCIA.137
The Hatch-Waxman Act and the BPCIA addressed these competing
concerns by essentially drafting a compromise. For pioneer companies, the
two laws provided various favorable protections, such as patent term
extensions to compensate for the delay caused by FDA review and market
exclusivities prohibiting the submission and/or approval of a new drug
application for a given amount of time.138 The two laws also provided various
favorable protections for generic drug manufacturers, such as abbreviated
new drug applications that did not require preclinical and clinical safety and
efficacy testing and a “safe harbor” provision overruling Roche that allowed
generics to test drugs for FDA approval without risk of infringement
lawsuits.139 Therefore, by including these protections in the Hatch-Waxman
Act and the BPCIA, Congress was able to balance the competing interests of
the pioneer companies and the general public.
In the BPCIA specifically, Congress established many mechanisms in
order to maintain the balance of these competing interests. For example, to
encourage innovation, Congress provided biologic companies a 12-year
period of exclusivity to recoup costs and make a profit.140 On the other hand,
to lower consumer drug prices and help biosimilars quickly reach the market,
Congress created an abbreviated pathway for FDA approval of
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biosimilars.141 The Sandoz v. Amgen case dealt with the particulars of this
abbreviated pathway.142 The remaining focus of this analysis discusses
whether the Federal Circuit remained consistent with the particulars of this
abbreviated pathway that Congress provided, so as to stay consistent with
the overall balance of competing interests behind the BPCIA.
As discussed previously, the Supreme Court in Sandoz v. Amgen found
Congress provided in the BPCIA the exclusive federal remedies that could
be taken against biosimilar applicants for noncompliance.143 Thus, since the
BPCIA did not provide for federal injunction, this remedy did not exist for
applicants’ noncompliance. The Federal Circuit extended this reasoning on
remand by finding Congress provided in the BPCIA the exclusive remedies,
federal or state, that could be taken against biosimilar applicants for
noncompliance.144 Thus, since the BPCIA did not provide for state
injunction, this remedy did not exist for applicants’ noncompliance. In
finding this, the Federal Circuit appears to have been conscious of the policy
considerations of the BPCIA.
First, when finding field preemption, the Federal Circuit considered
Congress’ intent that federal law exclusively occupy the field of biosimilar
litigation.145 In considering this, the Federal Circuit recognized Congress’
overarching intent behind the BPCIA:
The BPCIA is a complex statutory scheme . . . that establishes
processes both for obtaining FDA approval of biosimilars and for
resolving patent disputes between manufacturers of licensed
biologics and manufacturers of biosimilars. It sets forth a carefully
calibrated scheme for preparing to adjudicate, and then adjudicating,
claims of patent infringement. Congress established this scheme as
part of its careful balancing of innovation and consumer interests. 146

Thus, the Federal Circuit recognized that Congress’ purpose behind the
BPCIA was to balance the competing interests of pioneer sponsors and
biosimilar applicants. After considering this overarching intent, the Federal
Circuit went on to hold that the BPCIA was “comprehensive” and “carefully
drafted and detailed,” so presumptively Congress would have included state
law remedy or “left room for the States” if Congress intended biosimilar
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litigation to not be completely within the federal law field.147 Thus, in finding
field preemption, the Federal Circuit first considered the overarching
Congressional intent behind the BPCIA.
Next, when finding conflict preemption, the Federal Circuit considered
whether state law remedies would conflict with the BPCIA’s ultimate
objectives.148 In considering this, the Federal Circuit reflected on how
allowing patent holders to bring state law claims, in addition to federal law
claims, would impact biosimilar applicants.149 The Federal Circuit found
“compliance with the BPCIA’s ‘detailed regulatory regime in the shadow of
50 States’ tort regimes,’ and unfair competition standards, could
‘dramatically increase the burdens’ on biosimilar applicants beyond those
contemplated by Congress in enacting the BPCIA.”150 So, the Federal Circuit
again considered the overarching Congressional intent behind the BPCIA, to
balance the competing interests of pioneer sponsors and biosimilar
applicants, and how state law remedies would disrupt this balance. The
Federal Circuit found there would be disruption to this carefully crafted
balance if state law and federal law remedies existed because the biosimilar
applicants would have an added burden that Congress did not intend.151 Thus,
the Federal Circuit found conflict preemption because state law remedies
would conflict with the objectives of the BPCIA.152
So, in finding field and conflict preemption, the Federal Circuit
considered Congress’ policy concerns behind the BPCIA. Specifically, the
Federal Circuit considered the compromise Congress struck between pioneer
sponsors and biosimilar applicants. Further, the Federal Circuit did not
merely consider these policy concerns, but the Federal Circuit ruled in such
a way that maintained the careful balance Congress struck between the
pioneer sponsors and the biosimilar applicants. If the Federal Circuit had
ruled otherwise, the balance would have been upset in favor of sponsors and
against biosimilar applicants who would have had additional burdens.
Thus, it appears that the Federal Circuit has “gotten in right” in terms
of the underlying BPCIA policy concerns. Specifically, the Federal Circuit
appears to remain consistent with Congress’ underlying objective to balance
the interests of the pioneer sponsors and the biosimilar applicants. Rather
than ignore policy concerns, as critics believe the Federal Circuit has a
history of doing, the Federal Circuit here considered these policy concerns
147.
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152.
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and ruled in a way that maintained Congress’ policy objectives. Perhaps this
means that the Federal Circuit, at least in Sandoz v. Amgen and in the BPCIA
context, has “learned its lesson” and is staying more consistent with
Congress’ underlying policy concerns.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision makes clear that the requirement under
§ 262(l)(2)(A) of the BPCIA can only be enforced by the remedy provided
in § 262(l)(9)(C) and that no federal injunctive remedy exists. The Federal
Circuit’s decision makes clear that the requirement under § 262(l)(2)(A) of
the BPCIA can only be enforced by the remedy provided in § 262(l)(9)(C)
and that no state law injunctive remedy exists because of field and conflict
preemption. After analyzing the traditional preemption principles, it appears
the Federal Circuit correctly decided this issue. The Federal Circuit correctly
applied the law from traditional field and conflict preemption cases to find
that the field of patent law is generally a federal matter and that state law
remedies would conflict with the federal objectives in the BPCIA. Lastly,
after analyzing Congress’ underlying policy concerns in the BPCIA, it
appears that the Federal Circuit correctly decided this issue. The Federal
Circuit expressly considered these policy concerns in its opinion and ruled
in a way that supported Congress’ objectives. Thus, it appears that, at least
in Sandoz v. Amgen and in the BPCIA context, the Federal Circuit is
“learning its lessons” and is considering traditional legal principles and
policy concerns.

